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JOHN V. RYAN
held inadmissible, stopping and questioning can
still be constitutional and useful. Questioning
may prove that the suspect should be arrested
when the suspect's answers are obviously false
or when he admits that he has committed or is
about to commit a crime. Questioning at the time
of the stop allows an innocent suspect to tell his
story before he is booked. Thus questioning per-
mits the innocent suspect to clear himself before
his name and reputation are blemished by a
police record.v-
In sum, it is obvious that stop and frisk statutes
are both necessary and beneficial-to the police--
to the courts-and to the individual citizen who
is entitled to the protection of his life and property
which can only be guaranteed by aggressive and
efficient police procedures.
1178 HAu~v. L. REv. 473, 477 (1964).
THE LAST DAYS OF BAIL
JOHN V. RYAN
The modem system of granting a person accused
of a crime his freedom based upon his ability to
produce bail, security for his appearance at trial,
developed in England.' Originally, the sheriff
had the discretionary authority to release the
accused to the custody of a third party. Probably
the sheriff, who was personally responsible for his
prisoners, initiated the bail system to relieve
himself of this burden. If the defendant failed to
appear at trial, the third party was subjected to
the punishment due the accused.3 As time went on,
the third party was allowed to promise that he
would forfeit a stated amount of personal or real
property, rather than his freedom, if the defendant
did not appear at his trial. Thus, the bail system of
pretrial release evolved from a hostage arrange-
ment into a surety relationship.4 Soon thereafter,
the courts usurped the sheriff's discretionary
power to allow an alleged criminal his freedom
pending trial. With this innovation the bail system
in England reached the stage of evolution at which
we find it today.5
Because of the broad frontier and mobile popu-
lation of the United States, the private surety
device was not feasible. The defendant was often
a new arrival in the locale with no acquaintances in
the area who were willing to risk becoming his
SFREED & WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES 1
(1964).
2 Note, Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70
YALE L. J. 966 (1961).
3 2 PoLLocK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 585-90 (3d ed. 1899).
4 GoLDARB, RANsom 22 (1965). The change was
formalized in 1275 by the Statute of Westminster.
Note, supra n. 2 at 966.
5
OrXiELD, CRIlNAL PRocEDuRE Fpom ARREST
To TRIAL 104 (1947); PARY, THE LAW AN- 'iHE
POOR 228-29 (1914).
surety. As a result, the commercial bail bondsman
arose to replace the private surety in the American
system of pretrial release. The bondsman, who is
still a part of the American bail scheme, demands a
premium from the accused; in return he will put
up the security necessary to free the man. Since the
bondsman makes his living by being a professional
surety, the bases upon which he decides whether or
not he will put up bail for a particular defendant
are commercial and not personal. If he feels a
prisoner might not appear at trial, he will either
hedge against the possible forfeiture by demanding
collateral or refuse to make his service available to
the prisoner. 6 Although the bail system in the
United States has evolved into a commercial
bondsman system, the underlying policy of bail
has remained the same-one arrested and accused
of a crime may obtain his release pending trial if he
can adequately assure the court that he will appear
at the trial7
Thus, history indicates that the basic philosophy
underlying the monetary bail system in the United
States was imported from England. There is some
dispute as to what place the bail system was given
in the hierarchy of American jurisprudence. Some
scholars feel that the United States Constitution
gives a right to bails This point has never been
authoritatively decided. The right to bail, however,
6 Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HAv.
L. R-v. 1490 (1966); Comment, The Administration Of
Bail and Pretrial Freedom In Texas, 43 TEXAs L. Rv.
357-58 (1965).
7 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4-5, 8 (1952).
$ Professor Caleb Foote, in an exhaustive review of
the legislative history of the Eighth Amendment, con-
cluded that the only reason a right to bail was not ex-
pressly given was due to a drafting error. Foote, The
Coming Constitutional Crisis In Bail: I, 113 U. PA. L.
REv. 959-99 (1965).
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in non-capital cases is a federal statutory right. 9
Most states, in constitutional or statutory form,
have a similar provision.10 The United States
Constitution only mentions bail in the Eighth
Amendment, which prohibits excessive bail." But
whether this prohibition applies to the states is a
question that has never been decided by the
Supreme Court.'2 One reason that the Court has
never been called upon to answer the question is
that most states, in their constitution or statutory
law, have a similar provision prohibiting excessive
bail.13
Despite the question of constitutional right, bail
is a generally accepted procedure. Some theoreti-
cians feel that some form of pretrial release is
mandatory in our present day legal system. They
base their argument, in part, upon the assumption
that the presumption of innocence is more than an
evidentiary trial rule, and attaches to an alleged
criminal immediately upon his arrest."4 The other
basis utilized by this school of thought to justify
its position is that the defendant should be un-
hampered in the preparation of his defense. Incar-
ceration, they say, unduly restricts the accused in
the preparation of his defense."
9FED. R. Czmt. PRoc. 46; Carlson v. Landon, 342
U.S. 524 (1952); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1952).
Recently, the Bail Reform Act of 1966 has given a right
to pretrial release in all non-capital cases unless no
conditional release can reasonably assure appearance.
18. U.S.C. § 3146 (a), (b).
10 For a list of the various state provisions see Note,
supra n. 2 at 977.
I U.S. CONST. AMND. VIII.
"Also, some lower courts recently have assumed that
the Eighth Amendment has been incorporated in the
Fourteenth. E.g., Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708,
711 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965 (1963).
1 Note, A Study Of The Administration Of Bail It
New York City, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 696 (1958). (here-
after called N.Y. Bail Study).
" REPoRT Or THE U.S. Anoptxvy GxuutAn's
Com=rrFx ON PovTY AND Tim ADmSnsTRATiON
OF CRhIINAL JUsTIcE 58 (1963) (hereafter called
Arr'y GEN. REP.).
"s Recent empirical studies have revealed evidence,
albeit inconclusive, that pretrial incarceration'is pre-
judicial to the outcome of the trial in the following
respects:
a) the accused can not show that he is a gainfully
employed member of the community, hence he
has less chance to obtain probation,
b) he is convicted more often than his freed count-
erpart,
c) he receives longer sentences than his freed
counterpart,
d) he can not adequately prepare his defense due
to restricted communications with his attor-
ney,
e) he can not adequately prepare his defense
because he can not find witnesses whom he
knows only by description or first name,
A pretrial release system based upon the above
premises would free the great majority of those
who are arrested. It would detain only those who
could not adequately assure the court that they
would not flee to escape being tried. This is sup-
posedly the policy underlying our present bail
system, yet in practice, bail affects the release of
only a small portion of those who might safely be
allowed pretrial freedom.16 Whether or not one
agrees that a pretrial release system is mandatory,
there should be little opposition to the proposition
that some form of pretrial release is advisable. By
freeing most of those arrested, a vast amount of
custodial expense could be saved. Pretrial release
also makes the administration of criminal justice
more palatable to the innocent accused. Indirectly,
pretrial release lowers the expenses of certain wel-
fare agencies. An important consideration is that
it seems fair not to subject one to incarceration if
he has not been tried and convicted of his crime.
Lastly, if there were no pretrial release, and the
mere allegation that a person had committed a
crime would put him in jail, the abuse that would
flow from such a procedure could be enormous
indeed.'1
It has been suggested that the bail system does
not fulfill its policy of releasing all who can ade-
quately assure the court that they will appear at
their trials. This is a harsh indictment of our bail
system, but it is true. The reasons for the failure
of bail to live up to its underlying policy are many.
For one, the amount of bail one must pay to obtain
his release is generally set solely by the nature of
the offense.18 The court has a standard rate for
each classification of offense which it applies, in
most cases, to determine the amount at which bail
is to be set. Bail so set is said not to be excessive,
f) he changes his plea to guilty to obtain a speedy
disposition of his case.
FREED & WAr, supra n. 1 at 38; McCarthy and Wahl,
The District of Columbia Bail Project, 53 GEo. L. Rv.
685, 699-700 (1965); Note, The Development Of Release
On Recognizance And The Dane County Bail Study, 1965
W.rs. L. REv. 161-68; Wald & Rankin, Pretrial Freedom
And Ultimate Freedom, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 641 (1964);
N.Y. Bail Study 726-29.
However, it is possible that causes other than incar-
ceration produce the enumerated effects.
16 See n. 40, infra.
17 In effect, the bail system as it is now administered
does incarcerate the poor upon the mere allegation that
a crime was committed.
is See ATT'y GEN. REP. 62; Comment, supraI n. 6 at
363-71; N.Y. Bail Study 712-15; Note, Compelling
Appearance In Court: Administration Of Bail In Phila-
delphia, 102 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1043 (1954) (hereafter
called Phil. Bail Study).
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even though the defendant can not obtain the
amount needed to affect his release.
It is true that there is some relation between the
offense committed and the probability that the
offender will flee to avoid prosecution. However,
the relationship is slight,19 and there are many
other indicia which more accurately gauge the pos-
sibility that an offender will flee, 21 The theory of
bail is that the accused has given over enough
money to the court to satisfy the judge that the
accused will attend his trial rather than suffer a
forfeiture.21 Then certainly the amount at which
bail is set should depend. at least in part, upon the
financial status of the individual, since the wealth
of the accused to some extent determines what
amount of money is the amount which he would
not wish to lose by not appearing at his trial.n
When bail is set solely with regard to the nature of
the offense, many who offer little risk of non-
appearance are kept in jail because they can not
tender to the court the security demanded.n
Hence, the bail system as administered today is
unfair to the poor person.
A digression seems appropriate at this juncture
to point out a rather startling fact. The American
bail system generally does not deter any person it
releases from flight, because the defendant who
jumps bail forfeits nothing. This anomaly arises
because the commercial bondsman charges the
prisoner a nonreturnable premium. Thus, when
the freed defendant fails to appear at trial, only the
bondsman loses anything. 4 To combat this situa-
tion the bondsman, in some cases, demands col-
lateral in the amount of the bond. Thus, he, in
effect, forces the prisoner to be his own surety, and
a mere matter of liquidability forces the defendant
to pay the bondsman a premium for the bondsman's
service. And since he may demand collateral, or
refuse his services, the bondsman may decide who
is to go free and who is to stay in jail. Hence, the
bondsman, and not the judge, really determines
19 M[cCarthy & Wahl, supra n. 15 at 712-14.
20 See text at rn. 53-54, infra.
21 See text at n. 3, supra.
2 Statutes usually provide that the character and
financial ability of the defendant be considered as well
as the evidence and nature of the crime, but the courts
ignore these factors, probably because they can not
obtain adequate factual information.
23 AT'Y GEN.. REIP. 66-68; McCarthy & Wahl,
supra n. 15 at 679; Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhat-
tan Bail Project, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 80 (1963); N.Y.
Bail Study 712-15; Phil. Bail Study 1032-33.
24 Comment, supra n. 6 at 372; Phil. Bail Study 1060.
who obtains pretrial release, and then by a non-
judicial process.
25
Another reason why the bail system fails to re-
lease many who are theoretically eligible is be-
cause the system is used by some judges to keep
people in jail.26 This is done in two ways. Some
judges, although they realize that it is not neces-
sary to assure the accused's presence at his impend-
ing trial, will set bail at the amount usually set for
the offense. A less subtle method, but equally effec-
tive, is to set the bail in an excessive amount.n The
latter method works because usually by the time
the prisoner has received a hearing by an appellate
body on his claim that the amount of his bail is
excessive, his trial has already ended. If the prisoner
was found not guilty, then the question is moot. If
he was convicted, he faces the difficult task of prov-
ing that the detention was prejudicial to the out-
come of his case. In the event the prisoner is
granted a hearing prior to his trial, he still stands
little chance of getting released. This is due to the
rule in most jurisdictions that the order of the bail-
setting official will not be overturned unless the
accused can demonstrate a flagrant abuse of
discretion. But, even if he adequately proves his
point, there is no guarantee that the appellate
court will reset the bail at an amount within the
defendant's financial capabilities. 3
If one were to look for the intrinsic fault in our
present system of pretrial release, from which all
the above evils flow, he would find it to be that the
bail system demands money be paid for one's re-
lease. The monetary element of the system dis-
criminates against the indigent; and the indigent
or nearly indigent comprise about one-half of all
those in the United States who are accused of
crimes.29 The bail system subjects this segment of
the population to incarceration, and frees the
22 See text at nn. 5-6, supra. A New York bondsman
declared, "If a person comes in and I don't know him
or his lawyer we look for collateral; if they don't have
it, we don't bother with them." FREED & WALD, supra
n. 1 at 27.
26 AT'v GEN. REP. 60; Phil. Bail Study 1038-41;
Note, supra n. 6 at 1493.
2 Myriad examples are given in GOLDFARB, supra
n. 4 at 32-91.28See, e.g., Hodgdon v. United States, 365 F.2d
679 (8th Cir. 1966); GOLDFARB, supra n. 4 at 73; Foote,
The Coming Constitutional Crisis In Bail: II, 113 U.
PA. L. REv. 1125, 1131-32 (1965). But see n. 15, supra.
29 GOI.DFARB, supra n. 4 at 32; WALD, LAW A-D
POVERTY 6 (1965); Packer, Two Models Of The Criminal
Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 45 (1964); N.Y. Bail Study,
table II at 707; Phil. Bail Study 1032-33.
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wealthy. This violates the principle of equal protec-
tion under the law, as the Supreme Court ex-
pounded it, because the poor are entitled to the
same rights and privileges under the law as are the
wealthy."
The Supreme Court has not yet faced the
question of whether the bail system, as practiced
today, is a denial of equal protection. But if it
does, it will probably answer the question affirma-
tively. The recent expansion of the concept of
equal protection, that money should not determine
the quality of justice an accused receives, draws
one to this conclusion. Even if bail is only a
statutory right of the defendant, granting such a
right only to the rich is a denial of equal protec-
tion."
If the judicial branch has been slow in acting on
the monetary bail problem, some legislatures, law-
enforcement agencies and private groups have not.
The pioneer among the private groups is the
Vera Foundation. This eleemosynary organization
instituted the Manhattan Bail Project, a release on
personal recognizance experiment.n The purpose of
the Project was to develop and test procedures and
standards which would effectively enable one to
estimate the probability that an accused, if re-
leased, would appear at his trial. Once these were
established, prisoners who met the criterian were
recommended for release. The only security re-
quired of these prisoners to obtain their release was
a promise that they would present themselves at
their respective trials. Law students were used to
interview the prisoners and verify the informa-
tion.3 Another Vera Foundation experiment,
30Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Coppedge
v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
1 Id.
"IThe Project's basic premise is that financial
deterrents to flight are overrated, and the bail require-
ment is unnecessary. The Project leaders felt that the
defendant's ties with the community were the true
guarantors of his appearance at trial. Botein, The
Manhattan Bail Project: Its Impact On Criminology And
The Criminal Law Process, 43 TEXAs L. RZxv. 326
(1965).
The factors, which were weighted, were: employ-
ment record; family; references; length of local resi-
dence; current charge; previous record; special factors.
FREED & WALD, supra n. 1 at 60-61.34 The theory was that bail was usually set by the
nature of the offense because the bail setter had no way
of obtaining verified background information upon
which to base an individualized determination of the
possibility of release on recognizance or the necessary
amount of money required to deter flight. Botein,
supra n. 32 at 326-27.
complementary to the Manhattan Bail Project, was
the Manhattan Summons Project. This experiment
took place at the station houses rather than the
jails. When a suspect was brought to the station he
was interviewed, and, if he qualified, a recom-
mendation was made to the desk officer to issue a
summons to him rather than arrest him. 5
The Illinois legislature recently enacted a note-
worthy innovation. Under the new practice an ac-
cused can secure his release by depositing with the
court security worth ten percent of the amount of
his bail. The security may take the form of cash,
personal or real property. If he appears at the
subsequent trial, ninety percent of the security is
returned to him.3
These and other new devices, praiseworthy as
they may be, are not enough. The cash bail plan,
while injecting some real financial deterrent into
the bail system, still discriminates against the poor.
The Vera projects only aid those who offer virtually
no risk of non-appearance at trial.3U 7 Moreover, the
interviewers can only recommend, and the official
who sets bail is free to ignore the recommendation. 3"
Also, neither the Vera projects nor their progeny
included all classes of offenses. The pilot program
excluded recedivists and those thought to be unsafe
to release on recognizance.39 Probably the bail
system, based as it is on financial status, can not be
adjusted within its traditional confines to alleviate
its evils."° This is because the basic flaw, money, is
inherent in such a system. Thus, our legislatures
must develop a new pretrial release process. Some-
thing other than a financial deterrent method
should be adopted.
The Vera Foundation has, to some degree, solved
the legislatures' problems of what type of a system
should replace the present bail system. The
projects have shown that many of those accused of
crimes may be released on their word, because there
11 U.S. DEP'T Or JusTicE, NATOwAL CoNTERENcE
AND INxTEpn REPORT ON BArL AND CRnuNAL Jus-
TrCE XXII-XIV (1965) (hereafter called INTERn!
REPORT).
31 ILL. STAT. 38 § 110-12. See generally, address by
Professor Bowman to the Illinois Conference on Bail
and Indigency, 1965 U. Ix.. L.F. 35-41.
37 One problem the Vera Projects faced was that the
bail setting officer often took the failure to recommend
the prisoner for release as a negative recommendation.
INTERIm REPORT XXVII.
3 FREED & WALD, supra n. 1 at 62-63.
3" Narcotics offenses, sex crimes and homicides are
generally excluded. These crimes compose about 20%
of all defendants. INTErnru REPORT 75-85.
40 Foote, Foroard: Comment On The New York Bail
Stedy, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 689-90 (1958).
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are environmental deterrents inherent in our
society strong enough to stay them from flight.
These projects show that when a person has his
family, friends and job all in one locale, he will
rarely break such ties to avoid prosecution.4a
It is true that many can not qualify for release
under the Manhattan standards, but this does not
mean that the basic theory behind the projects is
not applicable to the American system of criminal
justice. The basic theory of the Vera projects was
that non-monetary deterrents to flight will be more
effective than the present financial deterrent sys-
tem. 2 Hence, by incorporating other deterrents,
in addition to the environmental ones, into the
system many more persons could be released upon
their own recognizance. The most utilitarian
deterrent which comes to mind is the criminal
sanction. That is, a recognizance jumper would be
subjected to criminal penalties.1 Non-financial
conditions could be imposed upon the defendant to
accommodate some portion of accused criminals to
whom release on personal recognizance can not be
made available. These conditional releases could,
for example, take the form of release in the custody
of a third party, release only during the day time,
or release restricting the defendant's freedom to a
certain locality or place of residence." Conditional
releases are actually just other forms of non-
financial deterrents to flight.
The foregoing demonstrates that the bail system
can not continue to co-exist with other, more deep-
seated, principles of our legal system, and that
there are reasonable alternatives available. The
next few years will see great changes in this area.
The remainder of this Comment is devoted to sug-
gesting the form the changes should take.
There is no need for pretrial release if one is not
arrested. It is not necessary to arrest a person to
compel him to appear in court to answer charges
against him. The issuance of a summons or a
citation can serve the same purpose. A police
officer could be empowered to give a citation to any
41 The Vera program recommended 40% of the
10,000 prisoners they interviewed between October of
1961 and April of 1964. In the first three and one-half
months of its existence, the District of Columbia
Bail Project freed about 17% of its interviewees. The
default rate, in both programs, was negligible. FREED &
WALD, supra n. 1 at 63-70.
42 See n. 32, supra.
4 California has recently initiated criminal sanctions.
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1319.4, 1319.6. The Bail Reform
Act of 1966 has made it a federal crime to fail to ap-
pear at trial when one is released on recognizance. 18
U.S.C. 3150.
4See 18 U.S.C. 3146(a) 1,2,5.
person whom the officer feels is releasable on his
own recognizance." Such a device has many
advantages. The officer, and the accused, would
not have to spend the time involved in traveling to
the station, and the ensuing booking, printing, and
the various reports that are required when a person
is arrested. Also, there would be no need for a
bail-setting hearing. The citation method would
promote better feelings in the public mind about
the police, since the minor violators will not be
dragged off to jail as is now the practice. On a
practical level, it would save custodial costs, and
the savings could be diverted to other areas of law
enforcement.
There could be some disadvantages in the sys-
tem. For one thing, the law officer will not be able
to determine if the person is wanted in connection
with another crime. The other patent disadvantage
in the citation system is that the officer can not
adequately verify the information he must elicit
from the accused upon which to base his determina-
tion of whether he will arrest the accused or issue a
citation."6 These inherent disadvantages can be
offset, at least in part, by the intelligent use of
discretion on the part of the officer. If he feels the
accused is lying as to his past record or personal
data, he should bring the defendant to the station
house.
One might object that the police officer will not
be able to intelligently determine whom he should
arrest and whom he should cite. This objection is
unfounded for two reasons. First, the police officer
makes difficult decisions every day. There is no
reason to suspect that he can not learn to apply the
release standards appropriately. Secondly, the
officer, at present, decides, largely on subjective
grounds, whether to arrest or to release a suspect.
The injection of a middle ground, issuance of a
citation, between the poles of arrest and release,
does not seem too burdensome or difficult a duty to
impose on the police officer. There may be some
concern as to the constitutionality of allowing an
officer such wide discretion in denying a person his
freedom on subjective grounds. Yet, he does the
same thing when he arrests someone. When he
performs this function he decides whether one will
keep his freedom or not. Both of the above objec-
tions seem to take on a less bright hue when one
U ILL. R-v. STAT., CH. 38 § 107-12 (1965).
46 The citation interview should be limited to com-
munity ties. These questions are innocuous, and are
speedily asked and answered, and least pry into the
private life of the individual.
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recalls that a form of the citation system has been in
effect in the area of traffic violations for some
time.
There is a danger that the police officer will be
reluctant to use the citation method due to an
antipathy to change or personal perverseness,
preferring to arrest the wrongdoers. To combat
this situation, the legislature could expressly state
in the act the policy that the citation method is to
be used to its fullest extent.
Another solution is to have the officer file a
written report explaining why he arrested a suspect
rather than issuing him a citation. The most
drastic move would be to make it mandatory that
the officer issue citations in certain instances. For
example, the statute could dictate that the officer
release all those accused of a crime whose maximum
penalty is less than the maximum penalty for the
failure to appear in compliance with a citation.
Exceptional .circumstances, which justify the
officer arresting an individual, should be enumer-
ated in the statute. Thus, the defendant who is
intransigent, belligerent, clearly unqualified for
release, or whom the officer feels is lying about his
background should come under the ambit of
exceptions."
Let us assume that the officer decides to arrest
an individual, rather than issue a citation to him,
and brings the defendant to the station. At this
point a precinct summons system, similar to the
Manhattan Summons Project,49 should be made
available to the defendant. The advantages of the
system are similar to the advantages of the cita-
tion system; it saves costs and promotes good
public relations. 9
One may wonder why the station house summons
is needed if there is a citation system in effect. One
reason is that the station house summons device is
more sophisticated than the citation plan. The
interviewer can make a much more complete
survey of the defendant's background than can the
police officer, and can quickly verify the informa-
tion. Hence, the desk officer who decides whether to
book the accused or issue a summons to him can
make a better informed determination of the
releasability of the defendant than can the officer
on the beat. Another reason that a station house
summons program is advisable is that both the
interviews and release decisions are performed by
persons not involved in the events leading up to the
4See n. 45, supra.
48 See text at n. 35, supra.
4D See INrEzm REPORT 70-71.
appearance of the defendant in the station house.
Hence, a dispassionate judgment as to the releas-
ability of the accused may be obtained by using
the station house summons system. Finally, the
interviewer and the desk officer will accrue a cer-
tain expertise in these matters not found in the
ordinary police officer. Since the release decision
can be made prior to incarceration, this second
pre-arrest hearing is not a duplication, but a much
needed implementation of the police officer's
release decision.
One aspect of the summons plan which merits
close consideration is how one keeps the interview
from being used as an interrogatory device. When
one considers the zeal of some law enforcement
officials and prosecutors, it seems wise to exclude
them from participating in the interview process.50
The safest course would be to make the interview
and its fruits inadmissible in any judicial proceed-
ing except the bail hearing and any appeal there-
from. This would eliminate the possibility of using
the interview to elicit incriminating evidence. Also,
it would not subject the accused to the necessity of
foregoing the interview and possible release if he
wishes to assert his privilege against self-incrim-
ination.
To insure full utilization of the summons system,
incentives similar to those enumerated in relation
to the sidewalk citation system may be adopted.5
If the desk officer determines that the defendant
is not eligible for release, then the individual will be
jailed. Thereafter, as soon as possible, the prisoner
should be given a hearing before a judicial official
to determine whether he is available for pretrial
release.m One may question whether such a third
stage is necessary, since the defendant has already
had two chances to be released. The reason for this
third step is, at base, that it would he imprudent to
not have, at some point in the system, a judicial
determination of the releasability of the defendant.
The fear of misuse and abuse of a process so depend-
ent upon discretion and subjectivity draws one to
the conclusion that the judiciary should have a
place in the system. A secondary reason for a
judicial hearing, after arrest, is that it is the
50 Apparantly, some of the programs patterned on
the Manhattan Bail Project have been guilty of pre-
venting the interview. I TESxm REPORT XXVII, 108.
Such uninvolved interviewers might increase the cost
of the programs, but not necessarily. The Manhattan
Projects used law students who donated their services.
For a good discussion of the types of interviewers that
could be used see id. at 85-99.
5 See text at n. 47, supra.
"2 See ILL. REv. STAT., CH. 38 § 110-2 (1965).
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earliest time that the accused may obtain counsel.
Representation of the accused by an attorney could
be an aid to the official in making the correct
decision. For example, he could bring before the
hearing officer, in a professional manner, any
facts inadvertently overlooked at the lower level
hearings, which might bear upon the releasability
of his client.
To assure that the post-arrest hearing official
releases all those who could be released, some type
of force factor should be introduced into the
system. One professional study group draft on pro-
posed standards for pretrial release suggests that all
those accused of misdemeanors should be presumed
releasable on their own recognizance. It contem-
plates that there be no investigation by the court of
the defendant's background unless the state requests
that the accused be denied pre-trial release. There
appears to be no valid reason for not expanding the
presumption to include all those cases where the
accused is charged with a felony whose maximum
sentence is less than the maximum sentence
imposable for recognizance jumping.
If the state asks that the accused be denied
release, what factors should be investigated and
brought to the attention of the official? The
following have been suggested as guides:
a) The length of defendant's residence in
the community.
b) The defendant's employment status and
history and his financial condition.
c) The defendant's family ties and relation-
ships.
d) The defendant's reputation, character and
mental condition.
e) The defendant's prior criminal record, in-
cluding any record of prior release on recog-
nizance or on bail.
f) The nature of the offense presently charged
and the apparent probability of conviction
and the likely sentence.
g) Any other factors indicating the defend-
ant's ties to the community or bearing on
the risk of willful failure to appear.
This seems to be a satisfactory list. Especially
gratifying to those who adhere to the Vera Foun-
dation theory is the inclusion of an omnibus clause,
provision "g", which indicates that the authors
of the draft consider the pretrial release program
to be based upon the character and background
of the individual. Since this policy is recognized,
the authors indicate that other factors, which are
out of the ordinary, may be of prime importance
in determining the releasability of an individual.
The results of the investigation should be put in
written form and presented to the official who is
to set bail, along with any recommendation as to
the releasability of the accused and any conditions
which the interviewer feels are necessary.
The most difficult point in a comprehensive
pretrial release system is what is to be done with
the prisoner the official feels is not eligible for
release. The solution, and apparently the only one,
is to allow the accused to be detained pending
trial. The present system detains those who can
not adequately assure the court thev will appear
at their trials if released. The problem arises when
one ventures into the area of detaining those who
present a serious threat to society, and not a threat
to the integrity of the judicial process.n
Although it has never been proven, there have
been repeated suggestions that the bail setter
often sets bail with the intention of keeping a de-
fendant in jail to protect society or a certain in-
dividual.Y" That this manipulation of the bail
system takes place is practically unprovable, since
the bail setter has such wide discretion. If pre-
ventive detention serves a beneficial public in-
terest, then it should be frankly recognized and
allowed. However, the rights and interests of the
defendant should be adequately protected. Under
the present bail system the defendant has vir-
tually no protection.
One objection to pretrial detention is the possible
prejudicial effect upon the outcome of the de-
fendant's trial, due to the defendant's inability to
prepare his defense as well as the free man." To
keep intact the integrity of the guilt-determination
process, such a possibility should be minimized.
This end could be achieved by establishing a de-
tention facility for those preventively detained or
detained to prevent flight which is separate from
the jail. Jail is a place to penalize and rehabilitate
one convicted of a crime. Pretrial detainees are
not being subjected to punishment for a crime,
but are detained to insure that they will not injure
the judicial process or society. Jail restricts the
unconvicted accused to an extent greater than
that required to adequately carry into effect the
purpose of his detention. 56
- 18 U.S.C.A. 3148 (Bail Reform Act of 1966) allows
preventive detention.
4 See text at nn. 26-27, supra.
55 See n. 15, supra.
56 See FREED & WALD, su ra n. 1 at 87-88. See
generally GOLDFARB, supra n. 4 at 247-48.
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If the result of the judicial release hearing is
that the accused is to be detained, then he should
be entitled to a de novo hearing before a court of
general criminal jurisdiction. Such a hearing is
necessary to safeguard all the rights of the accused.
Since the contemplated pretrial release scheme is
designed to release all but a few, the burden upon
the criminal courts should be slight. Such a hear-
ing would be much like the pretrial release hearing.
The factors and their weighting should be open
to contest by the accused. The procedure should
not be adversary, in the sense that a duty should
be imposed on both parties to bring all the per-
tinent facts before the judge, so that he may be
aided in his decision-making function.
To alleviate the present problem of the slow
appeal, a speedy appeal from the decision of the
court of general criminal jurisdiction should be
allowed. The present right of the accused to appeal
from a bail decision is so slow that it is illusoryY
An almost immediate appellate process would, of
course, be ideal in all criminal cases, but the bail
situation should have priority on the appellate
calendar. This proposition is made necessary if
one agrees that pretrial incarceration influences the
outcome of the defendant's trial. If one adheres to
the belief that incarceration does not affect the
outcome of the trial, then the immediacy of the
appeal may not appear to be so strong. However,
when one considers the nature of a release hearing
as opposed to the nature of a criminal trial, the
former still appears to hold its place of priority
on appeal. More specifically, the guilty decision
in a criminal trial is supposed to be based on evi-
dence beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused
committed a crime. The refusal of pretrial release
can not be based upon evidence beyond a reason-
able doubt. The release hearing must determine
that the accused only probably committed a crime.
But, the court must also decide if the threat that
the accused will commit a future crime is so mani-
fest that no form of conditional release will suffi-
ciently insure against the commission of this future
crime.A Such a decision can not be said to be a
moral certainty; it is only a prediction. Hence,
should not one denied his freedom by a prediction
have priority, on appeal, over one denied his free-
dom by a decision supposedly beyond a reasonable
doubt?
In fact, this latter point illustrates the strongest
6' See text at nn. 27-28, supra.
ts United States v. Davis, 37 F.R.D. 450 (D.C.
1965).
objection to preventive detention. It is probable
that a preventive detention plan will wrong some
defendants, just as our system of criminal justice
wrongly convicts some. But the present system of
setting bail, with its almost complete lack of safe-
guards, in all probability, wrongs many more. The
desired objective underlying an overt preventive
detention system is to include as many safeguards
as possible, to assure that the least number are
wronged by the system.
There is a question of what classes of defendants
should be preventively detained. A general answer
is to hold only those who must be held. Those who
pose a thread of immediate physical violence
should be detained. Proven recidivists should be
detained. Recognizance jumpers should be de-
tained, but only if no conditional release is ade-
quate to assure the court that such defendants will
not appear at trial. Those who can not be released
under any condition that will be adequate to
restrain flight should be detained.
The most difficult case is the defendant who is
free pending trial, and is accused of committing
another crime while free. No set rule can be stated
in these matters. The nature of the second crime
and its relation to the original offense could be
important. Yet, the mere allegation of a second
crime should not be enough to deny release after
arrest, unless the circumstances are such that, re-
gardless of the original offense, release would be
denied. To allow the first offense to be automati-
cally encompassed in the second release deter-
mination would open the system to abu.e. It is
submitted that the only solution available is that
if the state wishes to deny the defendant his free-
dom, because he has been charged with a second
crime while free pending trial for a separate crime,
then the state must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence before a court of general criminal
jurisdiction that the accused committed the first
and the second crimes. On first reading, this may
appear to be a too strict requirement, but anything
less would lack suffici-nt safeguards for the accused,
and allow preventive detention to be used as a
method of punitive detention.
It should be stressed that this half-trial of the
second crime should take place within a very short
time after arrest so there will be no undue incar-
ceration of the defendant. Another important
point is that the half-trial should be an adversary
proceeding, to insure that the state is actually
put to its proof.
